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Better Late than Never: A Critique of the
United States' Asylum Filing Deadline
from International and Comparative
Law Perspectives
By MISHA SEAY*

I. Introduction
This note critiques the filing deadline for asylum applications in
the United States by comparing it to relevant international standards
and the practices of other countries. It first looks to international
treaties governing asylum procedures and the obligations of the U.S.
under international law. It then compares the asylum procedures of
three countries that admit similarly large numbers of refugees Canada, Australia, and the United Kingdom - and discusses the filing
deadlines, if any, that they impose on asylum applications in their
respective countries. Finally, this note examines the U.S.'s filing
deadline for asylum applications (the one-year bar) and the
difficulties this deadline presents for asylum seekers in the U.S. The
note concludes that the one-year bar violates the U.S.'s treaty
obligations and is out of step with common practices of other
countries. It also concludes that the one-year bar is both unfair and
unreasonable and prevents otherwise eligible refugees from obtaining
asylum in the U.S., particularly impoverished asylum seekers. With
the possibility of comprehensive immigration reform approaching,
this note offers several recommendations for the U.S. government,
either to eliminate the one-year bar entirely or adopt other measures
to lessen its negative effects on bona fide asylum seekers.

* 2011 J.D. Candidate at the University of California, Hastings College of the Law;
M.Sc. 2007, London School of Economics and Political Science; B.A. 2005, University
of California, Santa Cruz. I would like to thank Professor Karen Musalo for her
invaluable comments and support while writing this article.
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II. International Law Pertaining to Refugees
Before comparing the U.S.'s asylum filing deadline with the
practices of other countries, it is important to provide context about
the U.S.'s obligations to refugees under international law. There are
two important international treaties relating to refugees that regulate
the nature of asylum procedures that states parties may adopt, in
addition to other more general international treaties on civil and
political rights.'

A. United Nations Convention and ProtocolRelating to the Status
of Refugees
The United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of
Refugees (Refugee Convention) and the United Nations Protocol
Relating to the Status of Refugees (Refugee Protocol) are the
principal international instruments governing refugees. The Refugee
Convention of 1951 defines a "refugee" as a person who,
owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race,
religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or
political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is
unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the
protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and
being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a

result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to
return to it.2

One of the most important obligations created by the Refugee
Convention is the duty of nonrefoulement.' Article 33 of the Refugee
Convention provides that "[n]o Contracting State shall expel or
return ("refouler") a refugee in any manner whatsoever to the
frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would be threatened
on account of his race, religion, nationality, membership of a
particular social group or political opinion."' Australia and Canada

1. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, openedfor signatureJul. 28,
1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 137; Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, Jan. 31, 1967,
606 U.N.T.S. 267; Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment, opened for signature Dec. 10, 1984, 1465
U.N.T.S. 85; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for
signatureDec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, 1057 U.N.T.S. 407.
2. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, supra note 1, art. 1(A)(2).
3. Id art. 33.
4. Id. art. 33(1).
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have acceded to the Refugee Convention, but the U.S. and the U.K.
have not.'
Adopted by the United Nations in 1967, the Refugee Protocol
eliminated the temporal and geographic limitations originally
included in the refugee definition.' More importantly, however, the
Refugee Protocol reaffirmed a commitment to the principles of the
Refugee Convention when it stated "States Parties to the present
Protocol undertake to apply articles 2 to 34 inclusive of the
Convention to refugees as hereinafter defined."7 As a result, any
state party that accedes to the Refugee Protocol, whether or not it has
ratified the Convention, thereby assumes the obligations imposed by
Articles 2 through 34 of the Refugee Convention, including the duty
of nonrefoulement. Canada, Australia, and the U.S. have acceded to
the Refugee Protocol - thereby adopting Articles 2 to 34 of the
Refugee Convention - but the U.K. has not.'
The U.S. modified its domestic laws to bring them into
compliance with the Refugee Convention and Protocol through the
Refugee Act of 1980 (Refugee Act).9 The Refugee Act modified the
U.S. definition of a refugee to conform to the definition in Article 1
of the Refugee Convention.'0 It also amended its provisions on
withholding of deportation to conform to Article 33 of the Refugee
Convention, stating that "[t]he Attorney General shall not deport or
return any alien... to a country if the Attorney General determines
that such alien's life or freedom would be threatened.. .."n

5. U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees, State Parties to the 1951 Convention
Relating to the Status of Refugees and the 1967 Protocol (Oct. 1, 2008),
http://www.unhcr.org/protect/PROTECTION/3b73b0d63.pdf.
6. Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, supra note 1, art. 1, 1 2-3.
7. Id. art. 1, j 1.

8. U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees, supra note 5.
9. Jaya Ramji, LegislatingAway InternationalLaw: The Refugee Provisionsof
the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant ResponsibilityAct, 37 STAN. J. INT'L
L. 117, 122 (2001); see also INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 436-37 (1987)
(stating that "one of Congress' primary purposes [for the Refugee Act of 1980] was
to bring United States refugee law into conformance with the 1967 United Nations
Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees . .
10. Ramji, supra note 9, at 122.
11. 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h) (1994) (emphasis added); see Leena Khandwala et al., The
One-Year Bar: Denying Protection to Bona Fide Refugees, Contrary to
CongressionalIntent and Violative of InternationalLaw, 05-08 IMMIG. BRIEFINGS 1
(2005).
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B. Other InternationalTreaties
Other international instruments also create a duty of
nonrefoulem.ent for those facing torture if returned to their home
Article 3 of the United Nations Convention Against
country.
Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment (CAT) prohibits contracting states from refouling any
person to a state "where there are substantial grounds for believing
that he would be in danger of being subjected to torture."1 The U.S.
assumed a duty of nonrefoulement of potential torture victims when
it ratified CAT in November 1994.14 The United Nations Human
Rights Committee (Human Rights Committee) has also interpreted
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) as
prohibiting the refoulement of certain individuals who may be
subjected to torture or similar treatment." Article 7 of the ICCPR
states that "[n]o one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman
or degrading treatment or punishment."" The Human Rights
Committee stated that State Parties are thus obligated not to expose
individuals to the danger of torture "by way of their extradition,
expulsion or refoulement." 7 The U.S. also assumed these obligations
when it ratified the ICCPR in June 1992.18

Finally, many

international scholars believe that nonrefoulement has reached the
status of customary international law."

12. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment, supra note 1, art. 3; International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, supra note 1, art. 7.
13. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment, supranote 1, art. 3.
14. Ramji, supranote 9, at 123.
15. U.N. Human Rights Committee, General Comment 20, 44th Sess., para. 9,
U.N. Doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev.1 at 30 (1992).
16. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 1, art. 7.
17. U.N. Human Rights Committee, supra note 15 (emphasis added).
18. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 1, art. 7;
UNITED NATIONS TREATY COLLECTION (Apr. 6, 2011, 14:44:45), http://treaties.un.

org/pagesfUNTSOnline.aspx?id=1 (select "ICCPR" and then select "Search;" select
"See Details" under "Participants" heading).
19. See e.g., Elizabeth Brundige, Too Late for Refuge: An InternationalLaw

Analysis of IIRAIRA's One- Year Filing Deadne for Asylum Applications, 7
BENDER'S IMMIGR. BULL. 778 (2002) (discussing this issue in more extensive detail).
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III. A Comparative Analysis of Asylum Procedures
The next Section briefly summarizes relevant asylum procedures
in Australia, Canada, and the U.K., and the types of filing deadlines,
if any, that they impose on asylum seekers in their respective
countries. It also looks at the European Union's approach to filing
deadlines. These three countries were chosen as comparators for two
reasons. First, on a practical level, information about their laws and
practices are widely available in English and thus more accessible to
the author for comparison. Second, with the exception of Australia,
they receive some of the highest number of asylum applications
annually according to recent statistics. 20 The U.S. continues to be the
largest recipient of new affirmative asylum claims among
industrialized countries; it received almost 24,000 applications in the
first half of 2009.21 Canada and the U.K. are not too far behind,
receiving nearly 19,000 and 18,000 asylum applications, respectively,
in the first half of 2009." Australia received approximately 2,500
applications in the first half of 2009.23 In light of such large numbers
of refugees applying for asylum each year, it is not surprising that
countries undertake measures to ensure that only the most-deserving
refugees are able to obtain asylum. The next section will discuss how
Australia, Canada, and the U.K. have chosen to deal with the large
number of refugee applications they receive on a yearly basis,
particularly those that are received long after a refugee has entered
the country.
A. Australia

Australia's treatment of refugees is divided between offshore
refugees and onshore refugees.24 Within the group of offshore
refugees, there are two kinds of protection available for people

20. U.N. HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES, ASYLUM LEVELS AND TRENDS IN
INDUSTRIALIZED COUNTRIES FIRST HALF OF 2009 23 (2009), available at
http://www.unhcr.org/4adebca49.html.
21. Id.
22. Id.
2 3. Id.
24. Dean Lusher et al., Australia'sResponse to Asylum Seekers, in YEARNING
TO BREATHE FREE: SEEKING ASYLUM IN AUSTRALIA 9, 11 (Dean Lusher & Nick
Haslam eds., 2007).
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fleeing persecution and gross violations of human rights. Offshore
refugees who meet the definition of a refugee under the Refugee
Convention can be resettled in Australia and granted refugee status.
The majority of these applicants are identified and referred by the
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), and
their claims are processed by Australian diplomatic missions abroad.26
The government also has a Special Humanitarian Program, which
offers resettlement to other individuals who do not meet the
definition of refugee outlined in the Refugee Convention, but who
are subject to substantial discrimination amounting to a gross
violation of their human rights.2
Onshore refugees, on the other hand, are divided between those
who arrive with a valid entry visa and those who do not. 28 The
majority of asylum seekers without a visa arrive by boat to land areas
outside of Australia's Migration Zone, and they are referred to as
Irregular Maritime Arrivals (IMA).2 In 2001, Australia's Federal
Parliament excised certain external territories - Ashmore and Cartier
Islands, Christmas Island, and Cocos Islands - from the Migration
Zone to allow the government to address the high numbers of
refugees arriving to these areas by applying a different set of
procedures." IMA are detained and transferred to Christmas Island
until their claims for protection have been completed through a
separate process called the Protection Obligation Assessment." By
25. Id.
26. Id.; INTERGOVERNMENTAL CONSULTATIONS ON MIGRATION, ASYLUM, AND
REFUGEES, ASYLUM PROCEDURES: REPORT ON POLICIES AND PRACTICES IN IGC
PARTICIPATING STATES 28 (2009) [hereinafter ASYLUM PROCEDURES].
27. Refugee and HumanitarianEntry to Australia, AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT
DEPARTMENT OF IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP, http://www.immi.gov.au/visas/
humanitarian/offshore/ (last visited Mar. 7, 2011).
28. Lusher et al., supra note 24, at 11.
29. Id at 12. See generallyProtection ObhigationsDetermination,AUSTRALIAN
GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENT OF IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP, http://www.immi
(last
.gov.au/visas/humanitarian/onshore/protection-obligationsdetermination.htm

visited Mar. 8, 2011), and Fact Sheet 75 - ProcessingIrregularMaritime Arivals,
AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENT OF IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP,
http://www.immi.gov.au/medialfact-sheets/75processing-irregular-maritime-arrivals.
htm (last updated Feb. 18, 2011) (information on Irregular Maritime Arrivals and
the asylum process they are subjected to, called Protection Obligation Assessment).

30. Fact Sheet 81

- Australia's Excised Offshore Places, Australian

GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENT OF IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP, http://www.immi.

gov.aulmedialfact-sheets/81excised-offshore.htm (last updated Feb. 16,2011).
31. The Protection Obligation Assessment procedure for onshore refugees
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contrast, refugees who arrive by boat or plane, with a visa, and who
subsequently seek asylum at a port of entry or from within the
country are subjected to a different set of procedures.32 This note is
primarily concerned with filing deadlines imposed on onshore asylum
seekers who are applying for asylum after entering Australia on a
valid visa.
Under the Migration Act, Australia offers asylum to immigrants
who meet the refugee definition of Article 1(A) of the Refugee
Convention.33 Onshore refugees can apply for asylum from the
Department of Immigration and Citizenship (DIAC) at either a port
of entry from within Australia.3 Applications are reviewed for
eligibility based on the Refugee Convention's definition of a refugee,
as incorporated into Australian law, and on Australia's additional
While their applications are
health and character requirements.
pending, applicants are eligible for a Bridging Visa (BV) which allows
them to remain in the country for the duration of the asylum
process.36 Once a refugee is found eligible for asylum, the individual
is granted a Protection Visa (PV), which affords them permanent
residence in the country.37
In the past, Australia has been criticized for various restrictive
policies towards arriving refugees, including mandatory detention,
the prior system of Temporary Protection Visas,39 and the "Pacific
arriving without a valid entry visa was recently streamlined and now applies to all
refugees interviewed after March 1, 2011. Fact Sheet 75 - Processing Irregular
Maritime Arivals, AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENT OF IMMIGRATION AND
CITIZENSHIP, supranote 29.
32. Lusher et al., supra note 24, at 11 - 12.
33. Andreas Schloenhardt, To Deter, Detain and Deny: Protection of Onshore
Asylum Seekers in Australia,14 INT'L J. REFUGEE L. 302, 307 - 08 (2002).
34. ASYLUM PROCEDURES, supra note 26, at 25, 27.
35. Schloenhardt, supra note 33, at 308.
36. ASYLUM PROCEDURES, supra note 26, at 29.
37. See Onshore - Protection, AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENT OF
IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP, http://www.immi.gov.au/refugee/seeking-protection.
htm (last visited Mar. 7, 2011) (information about Protection Visas).
38. Australia's mandatory detention was introduced in 1992 and states that all
people who arrive by boat without a valid entry visa must be detained indefinitely in
immigration detention centers until granted a visa or removed from the country.
Exceptions include the elderly, sick, and children under 18. Lusher et al., supra note
24, at 12-13.
39. In 1999, Australia created a new visa regime for asylum seekers arriving by
boat called Temporary Protection Visas (TPV). Once granted TPV status, a refugee
had to wait thirty months before being eligible to apply for permanent protection. In
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Strategy."" Despite this restrictive history, however, Australia has no
Instead, the
formal filing deadline for asylum applications.41
timeliness of an application may relate to an applicant's credibility.
Applications made soon after arrival are considered as "evidence to
support the conclusion that the applicant has a genuine fear, but this
factor cannot be regarded as determinative of that issue."42 For
example, in Selvaduri v. Ministerfor Immigration andEthnic Affairs,
the Federal Court of Australia stated that a twenty-month delay
could be taken into account "in assessing the genuineness, or at least
the depth, of the applicant's alleged fear of persecution." 43 Australian
courts also recognize that refugees come from varied cultural
backgrounds and have varying degrees of familiarity with the
language and legal system of the country." They are aware that it is
not uncommon for immigrants to feel fear and distrust towards the
authorities, all of which may cause a refugee to delay in filing an
application for asylum. 45
Australia did, however, have a time limitation as to when asylum
applicant can apply for work permission. Before July 2009, refugees
who filed asylum applications more than forty-five days after arriving
to Australia lost the right to obtain work permission.46 As of July
2009, however, the forty-five-day rule was replaced with more lenient
work permission policies.47 All asylum applicants now waiting for a
the interim, people were not allowed to reunite with their families and freedom of
movement was severely restricted. Lusher et al., supra note 24, at 15. The
Temporary Protection Visa regime is no longer in place. ASYLUM PROCEDURES,
supranote 26, at 25.
40. In 2001, the Australian government entered an agreement with the island
nation of Nauru in which any unauthorized immigrants in the "migrant zone" who
were coming to Australia but had not yet landed on shore were sent to Nauru to have
their asylum applications processed. Known as the "Pacific Strategy," this allowed
Australia to circumvent its nonfoulement obligations under the Refugee Convention
because Naura is not a signatory to the Convention. Lusher et al., supra note 24, at
16.
41. See Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (Austl.), available at http://www.austlii.edu.aul
au/legis/cth/consolact/mal958118/.
42. Roz GERMOV & FRANCESCO MOTTA, REFUGEE LAW IN AUSTRALIA 526
(2003).
43. Selvaduri v. Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1994) 34 A.L.D.
347, 364 (Austl.).
44. GERMOV & MOTTA, supra note 42, at 526.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 525.
47. See Bridging Visa A, AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENT OF
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decision from the Refugee Review Tribunal can obtain work
permission by applying for a BV "with permission to work." 48 This
change in policy - which obviously provides greater access to work
for refugees awaiting resolution of their asylum applications - should
be contrasted to the U.S. approach which prohibits asylum seekers
from obtaining work permits until applications for asylum have been
pending without decision by the United States Citizenship and
Immigration Services or the Executive Office for Immigration
Review for more than 180 days.49
B. Canada

Refugee determination in Canada is divided into an overseas
program, conducted abroad by visa officers, and an inland program,
conducted within Canadian territory.o As part of the inland program,
asylum seekers can apply for asylum (refugee protection) at a port of
entry upon arrival or at an immigration office inside Canada." There
are two stages to any refugee protection application. First, an
individual conducts an interview with an immigration officer at the
Canada Border Services Agency (at a port of entry) or the
Department of Citizenship and Immigration Canada (inside Canada)
who determines whether the applicant is eligible to make a claim for
refugee protection.52 This initial screening mechanism is intended to
weed out individuals who are barred from applying for refugee
protection for any of reasons enumerated in the Canadian
immigration statutes." Applicants who pass this screening have their
AND CITIZENSHIP, http://www.immi.gov.au/refugee/permission/a.htm
and Bidging Visas, AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT
DEPARTMENT OF IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP, http://www.immi.gov.au/allforms/
IMMIGRATION

(last visited Mar. 7, 2011)

pdf/1024i.pdf (last visited Mar. 7, 2011) (information about Bridging Visas).
48. Bridging Visas, AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENT OF IMMIGRATION
AND CITIZENSHIP, supranote 47, at 1.
49. Asylum seekers can submit an application for a work permit 150 days after
filing their asylum application, but it cannot be granted until 180 days has passed
from the application date. Procedures for Asylum and Withholding of Removal, 8
C.F.R. § 208.7(a)(1) (2010).
50. Stacey A. Saufert, Closing the Door to Refugees: The Denial of Due Process
forRefugee Claimants in Canada,70 SASK. L. REv. 27, 33 (2007).
51. Id
52. Id; see also Refugee Claims in Canada - After Applying, CITIZENSHIP AND
IMMIGRATION CANADA (CIC) http://www.cic.gc.calenglish/refugees/inside/applyafter.asp (last modified Oct. 24, 2008) (information about claiming refugee status).
53. Applicants ineligible to submit a claim for protection include those who: 1)
are under a final removal order; 2) have already received refugee protection in
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claims referred to the Refugee Protection Division of the
Immigration and Refugee Board (IRB), an independent
administrative tribunal that assesses all refugee protection claims in
Canada, to submit an asylum application (personal information
form) .
Like Australia, there is no formal filing deadline placed on
asylum applications in Canada; instead, a delay in filing can be
considered when assessing the credibility of the applicant." Canadian
courts appear to review an applicant's explanation for delay in filing
for asylum on a case-by-case basis, and whether the applicant's
explanation is credible in light of the surrounding circumstances."
The Federal Court of Appeal stated that a "delay in making a claim
to refugee status is not a decisive factor in itself. It is, however, a
relevant element which the tribunal may take into account in
assessing both the statements and the actions and deeds of a
claimant."" For example, in a case involving domestic violence, the
Federal Court of Canada found that a lack of awareness that spousal
abuse was a basis for asylum was an "entirely credible" explanation

Canada or elsewhere; 3) have previously applied and been denied refugee status in
Canada, or made claims that were ineligible, withdrawn, or abandoned; 4) are
inadmissible on grounds of security, violating human or international rights,
organized criminality or serious criminality; or 5) have come directly or indirectly
from a country designated as a "safe third country." Processfor Making a Claim for
Refugee Protection, IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE BOARD OF CANADA (IRB),
http://www.cic.gc.calenglish/refugees/inside/apply-after.asp (last modified Feb. 15,
2010).
54. Saufert, supra note 50, at 33; see also Refugee Claims in Canada - After
Applying, CIC, supra note 52.
55. ASYLUM PROCEDURES, supra note 26, at 90.
56. See, e.g., Diluna v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), 1995
CarswellNat 339, para. 8 (Can. F.C.) (WL) (finding that a doctor's letter showing the
applicant suffered from post-traumatic stress symptoms could support an explanation
for the delay); Elcock v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 1999
CarswellNat 1864, para. 17 (Can. F.C.) (WL) (finding that an applicant "had every
reason, given their fear of returning to Grenada, to keep a low profile"); Diallo v.
Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [2002] F.C. 1676, para. 9 (Can.)
(finding that applicant's explanation that she was on a student visa and had a
physician's letter showing she was suffering from depression "seem quite
reasonable"); and El Balazi v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration),
[20061 F.C. 80, para. 7 (Can.) (finding that the possession of a student visa, which the
applicant believed would expire at a later date than it actually did, is a factor
supporting a determination that a delay was reasonable).
57. Huerta v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1993] F.C.
271, para. 4 (Can.).
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for the applicant's delay in filing." By contrast, spousal abuse would
not fall under the two exceptions to the U.S.'s one-year bar to asylum
(see Section IV).
In 2004, the IRB Legal Services issued a guidance paper, titled
Assessment of Credibility in Claims for Refugee Protection,which
summarized the relevant law for the Refugee Protection Division and
reiterated that the timeliness of an application is relevant to
credibility determinations, although it is not necessarily conclusive.
Section 2.3.9 of the guidance paper analyzes recent case law and
suggests how cases involving long delays in claiming refugee status
should be handled.60 The paper clearly states that "[d]elay seeking
and applying for refugee protection is not an automatic bar to a claim
for protection."6 ' Nevertheless, delay in claiming refugee status "'is
an important factor which the Board is entitled to consider in
weighing a claim for refugee status."' 62 The paper also reaffirms the
holdings in various cases suggesting that a delay in filing could
indicate a lack of subjective fear of persecution because someone with
a genuine fear of persecution would apply as soon as possible.63
Therefore, the timeliness of an application may factor into the merits
of an application, rather than be treated as a strict procedural barrier.
Furthermore, the paper recognizes that there may be special
circumstances contributing to delay, such as those faced by abused
women or asylum applicants with psychological conditions.
Interestingly, in 1999, Canada considered imposing a thirty-day
time limit on filing refugee protection applications.6 ' The proposal
was published in a government report titled Building on a Strong
Foundation for the 21st Century: New Directions for Immigration

58. Williams v. Canada (Secretary of State), [1995] F.C. 1025, para. 7 (Can.).
59. Assessment of Credibility in Claims for Refugee Protection,IMMIGRATION
AND REFUGEE BOARD OF CANADA, (Jan. 31, 2004), http://www.irb-cisr.gc.cafEng/
brdcom/references/legjur/rpdspr/cred/Pages/index.aspx#239.
60. Id.
61. Id
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id
65. CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION CANADA, BUILDING A STRONG FOUNDATION
FOR THE 21ST CENTURY: NEW DIRECTIONS FOR IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE POLICY
AND LEGISLATION 43 (1998), available at http://dsp-psd.pwgsc.gc.ca/Collection/Ci5l-

86-1998E.pdf.
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and Refugee Policy and Legislation.' The report laid out potential
changes to Canada's refugee policy and specifically proposed a thirtyday-deadline for making a refugee protection claim, subject to
exceptions in certain compelling circumstances." The thirty-day-time
limit proposal was never adopted or implemented. Also interesting is
that the proposal came three years after the U.S. adopted the oneyear filing deadline for asylum claims.6 Although it is unclear
whether the U.S. experience had any impact on the Canadian
proposal, the failure of the Canadian government to adopt the
proposal is instructive because it shows that Canada considered
implementing filing deadlines for asylum applications but has rejected
the idea. 69
A final instance in which filing deadlines have been discussed in
Canada - albeit indirectly - is in a case challenging the Canada-

United States Safe Third Country Agreement (STCA).o In Canadian
Council of Refugees v. The Queen, a Colombian national was denied
asylum in the U.S. for failing to apply within one year.7' He
subsequently sought asylum in Canada, but his claim was denied
based on the STCA between the two countries. 72 The applicants (or
plaintiffs) argued that Canada's Cabinet exceeded its statutory
authority by designating the U.S. as a safe third country because the
U.S. implementation of the one-year bar rule meant that it did not
adequately protect asylum seekers from refoulement.1 Writing for
the Federal Court, Justice Phelan found that his court had authority
6 6. Id.
67. Id.
68. Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub.
L. No. 104-208, 100 Stat. 3009 (1996).
69. Although it is not uncommon that part of these proposals fail to make it into
the draft legislation, the author is unaware of the specific reasons that the filing
deadline was rejected.
70. The Safe Third Country Agreement is an agreement between the United
States and Canada in which individuals seeking asylum in either country must apply
in the first country they arrived in. In other words, asylum applicants cannot travel
through either country to apply for asylum in the other. Agreement for Cooperation
in the Examination of Refugee Status Claims From Nationals of Third Countries,
U.S.-Can., Dec. 5, 2002, 2002 U.S.T. LEXIS 125.
71. Canadian Council for Refugees, Canadian Council of Churches, Amnesty
International and John Doe v. Her Majesty The Queen, [2007] F.C. 1262, para. 13
(Can.).
72. Id.
73. Id. para. 144; see also SUSAN KNEEBONE, REFUGEES, ASYLUM SEEKERS AND
THE RULE OF LAW: COMPARATIVE PERSPECrlVES 111 (2009).
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to review the Cabinet's designation and concluded that the U.S. was
not in "actual" compliance with the requirements of the STCA.74 He
writes, "the weight of the expert evidence is that the higher standard
for withholding [of removal] combined with the one-year bar may put
some refugees returned to the U.S. in danger of refoulement. This
creates a real risk."7 He further states that the one-year bar rule as
applied in the U.S. is inconsistent with the Convention Against
Upon review, the
Torture and the UN Refugee Convention.
Federal Court of Appeals reversed, finding that Justice Phelan's
decision failed to give proper deference to Cabinet's designation of
the U.S. as a safe third country.' However, the Court's decision did
not directly address the merits of Justice Phelan's criticisms of the
one-year bar based on the expert evidence he reviewed. It merely
held that the courts did not have the power to supplant the Cabinet's
designation with its own investigation and conclusion that the U.S.
was not a safe third country for purposes of the STCA." Despite the
ultimate outcome of this case, Justice Phelan's condemnation of the
U.S. one-year bar rule is instructive because it demonstrates a real
concern regarding the rule's compliance with international law.
C. United Kingdom
The U.K.'s refugee program is divided into the Gateway
Protection Programme, conducted at diplomatic missions abroad, and
the normal asylum process for refugees at ports of entry or within the
U.K. 9 Individuals who wish to make an application through the
normal asylum process must visit the office of the United Kingdom
Border Agency (UKBA) in Croydon (London) to be screened."' The
UKBA is the body responsible for processing all asylum claims from
their start to their resolution." Upon completion of screening,
74. Canadian Council for Refugees, Canadian Council of Churches, Amnesty
International and John Doe v. The Queen, [2007] F.C. 1262, para. 154 (Can.); see
also KNEEBONE, supra note 73, at 111 - 12.
75. Canadian Council for Refugees, [2007] F.C. at para. 154.
76. Id.
77. The Queen v. Canadian Council for Refugees, Canadian Council of
Churches, Amnesty International and John Doe, [2008] F.C. 229, para. 61 (Can.); see
also KNEEBONE, supranote 73, at 117 - 18.
78. The Queen v. Canadian Council for Refugees, [2008] F.C. 229, para. 61.
79. ASYLUM PROCEDURES, supra note 26, at 366.
8 0. Id.
81. Id. at 365.
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applicants are then routed through one of three processes: the normal
asylum procedures, the Detained Fast-Track procedure, or through
Third Country procedures."
Regardless of which process the applicant's asylum claim is
placed in, there are no specific time limits for making an asylum
Similar to Australia and Canada, however, "an
application.'
delay
in applying for asylum following arrival in the U.K.
unexplained
is likely to damage an applicant's general credibility."" For instance,
Section 8 of the Asylum and Immigration Act 2004 lists a number of
factors that go to an applicant's credibility, including "any behaviour
by the claimant that the deciding authority thinks ... is designed or
likely to obstruct or delay the handling or resolution of the claim or
the taking of a decision in relation to the claimant."" Paragraph 339N
of the Immigration Rules now incorporates Section 8 "[in
determining whether the general credibility of a person has been
Courts have interpreted Section 8 as requiring
established."'
applicants who delay before filing an application to "credibly explain"
why they did not do so promptly.87 Nevertheless, Paragraph 339M of
the Immigration Rules states that "[a]pplications for asylum shall be
neither rejected nor excluded from examination on the sole ground
that they have not been made as soon as possible."8

82. Id. at 368.
83. Id. at 377.

84. Id.
85. Asylum and Immigration Act, 2004, c. 19, § 8 (U.K.) (emphasis added).
86. Immigration Rules Part 11 - Asylum, U.K. BORDER AGENCY, http://www.
ukba.homeoffice.gov.uk/policyandlaw/immigrationlawlimmigrationrules/partll/ (last
visited Apr. 6, 2011). Paragraph 339L states that asylum claims based on statements
that are not supported by documentary or other evidence do not need confirmation
as long as five conditions are met, one of which is that the claim was made at "the
earliest possible time, unless the person can demonstrate good reason for not having
done so. . .." Id. Additionally, Paragraph 339M provides that the Secretary of State
may consider an asylum claim to be unsubstantiated and deny the application if the
applicant "fails, without reasonable explanation, to make a prompt and full disclosure
of material facts . . . this includes, for example .

.

. failure to complete an asylum

questionnaire or failure to comply with a requirement to report to an immigration
officer for examination." Id.
87. See, e.g., JT (Cameroon) v. Sec'y of State for the Home Dept., (2008) A.C.
878 [16, 20, 21] (appeal taken from Asylum Immig. Trib.); andR. (on the application
of Q) v. Sec'y of State for the Home Dept., (2003) A.C. 364 [191] (appeal taken from
Q.B.) (U.K.).
88. See ImngrationRules Part11 - Asylum, U.K. BORDER AGENCY, supra note
86.
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Although the U.K. has no strict time deadline for filing asylum
applications, organizations representing asylum seekers have still
expressed concern that Section 8 results in adjudicators "ignoring the
underlying trauma of fleeing persecution and instead seeking
evidence of deceit by focusing on behaviours outside the country of
persecution, behaviour which is often in fact indicative of persecutory
experience. "9 In other words, in cases in which there has been a
delay in filing, Section 8's analysis of credibility creates the risk that a
bona fide claim for asylum will not be given objective consideration.'
Delay in filing for asylum can also affect the provision of public
benefits to asylum-seekers under the National Asylum Support
Service (NASS). The U.K. Secretary of State has the authority to
provide accommodation and social assistance to refugees that appear
destitute or are likely to become destitute within a fourteen-day
period after arrival. 1 However, under the Nationality, Immigration
and Asylum Act of 2002, the Secretary of State may not provide such
support to a person who "the Secretary of State is not satisfied that
[their asylum] claim was made as soon as reasonably practicable after
None of these
the person's arrival in the United Kingdom."'
provisions bar an individual from applying for or obtaining asylum
because of the applicant's failure to apply within a specified period of
time after arrival.
D. European Union Directives
While members of the European Union each have their own
national legislation establishing asylum protection in their respective
countries, in 1999 the European Union Council pledged to develop
"common standards for a fair and efficient asylum procedure" in the
E.U. Member States." To that end, the E.U. issued a Council
Directive in 2005 outlining minimum standards for Members States to

89. ASYLUM AID, UNSUSTAINABLE: THE QUALITY OF INITIAL DECISION-MAKING IN
WOMEN'S ASYLUM CLAIMS 58 (2011), available at http://www.asylumaid.org.uk/data
files/unsustainableweb.pdf.
90. Id. at 59.
91. ASYLUM PROCEDURES, supranote 26, at 379.
92. Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act, 2002, c.41, § 55(1) (UK).
93. Id.
94. Cathryn Costello, The European Asylum Procedures Directives in Legal
Context 1 (U.N.H.C.R., Paper No. 134, 2006), available at http://www.unhcr.org/
researchlRESEARCH/4552f1cc2.pdf.
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follow in granting and withdrawing refugee status." Article 8(1) of
the Council Directive, which deals with requirements for asylum
applications, states that such applications are to be "neither rejected
nor excluded from examination on the sole ground that they have not
been made as soon as possible."" This article is subject to Article
23(4)(i), which states that failure to apply earlier "without reasonable
cause ... having had opportunity to do so" is one of the grounds upon
which E.U. Member States can use accelerated procedures to process
the applications.' Taken together, the E.U. Directive allows Member
States to process delayed applications through separate accelerated
procedures; however, it does not permit the rejection or exclusion of
such applications solelyon the basis of their being untimely.
IV. Asylum Procedure in the United States
In 1980, Congress enacted the Refugee Act which created two
main pathways by which refugees could obtain protection in the U.S.98
The first is the Overseas Refugee Program for individuals still outside
the U.S." The second is asylum and withholding of removal for
individuals who are seeking entry at the border or who are already
within the territory of the U.S." As discussed above, a significant
feature of the Refugee Act was its incorporation of the U.S.'s treaty
obligations under the Refugee Convention and Protocol."o' The
Refugee Act adopted the definition of a refugee under Article 1 of
the Refugee Convention." Under this new law, a refugee may be
granted asylum in the U.S. if he or she is unwilling or unable to return
to his or her home country because of "persecution or a well-founded
fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality,
membership in a particular social group, or political opinion."103
The Refugee Act contained no filing deadline on asylum
95. Council Directive 2005/85 (L 326) (EC).
96. Id art. 8(1).
97. Id art. 23(4)(i); see also Costello, supra note 94, at 9.
98. KAREN MUSALO ET AL., REFUGEE LAW AND POLICY: A

COMPARATIVE AND

INTERNATIONAL APPROACH 74(2007).

99. Id.
100. Immigration and Nationality Act §§ 207-208, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1157-1158 (1980);
see also MUSALO, supranote 98, at 74.
101. Ramji, supranote 9, at 122.
102. Id.
103. Immigration and Nationality Act § 101(a)(42)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A).
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applications." This changed in 1996 when Congress passed another
statute called the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant
Responsibility Act (IIRIRA). 05 One of the most significant reforms
contained in the IIRIRA was what is now commonly known as "the
one-year bar" to asylum.'" The rule states that an individual is
ineligible for asylum "unless the alien demonstrates by clear and
convincing evidence that the application has been filed within one
year after the date of the alien's arrival in the United States."
There are two exceptions to the rule which may be granted at
Attorney General's discretion: (1) "changed circumstances which
materially affect the applicant's eligibility for asylum," or (2)
"extraordinary circumstances relating to the delay in filing."'"
A. History of the IIRIRA and the One-Year Bar

The passage of the IIRIRA took place during a wave of antiimmigrant sentiment in the mid-1990s." Immigrants - including
refugees - were blamed for a range of social problems, including
drugs, crime, and high unemployment."o As sometimes happens
when the U.S. experiences a large influx of undocumented
immigrants, new calls were made for immigration reform."' During
that time the asylum system was attacked by critics claiming that it
was "out of control" with frivolous asylum applications."2
One concern was that immigrants were not seeking asylum in
order to find safe haven, but merely to obtain work permits."' The
104. Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 82-414, 66 Stat. 163
(1952).
105. Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996; see
also Karen Musalo & Marcelle Rice, Center for Gender and Refugee Studies: The
Implementation of the One- Year Bar to Asylum, 31 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L.
REV. 693,693 (2008).
106. Musalo & Rice, supranote 105, at 693.
107. Immigration and Nationality Act § 208(a)(2)(B), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(2)(B).
108. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(2)(D).
109. Ramji, supra note 9, at 133; Michele R. Pistone & Philip G. Schrag, The New
Asylum Rule: Improved but Still Unfair,16 GEO. IMMIG. L. J. 1, 1- 2 (2001).
110. Ramji, supra note 9, at 133.
111. Michele R. Pistone, Asylum Fing Deadlines: Unfair and Unnecessary, 10
GEO. IMMIG. L. J. 95, 101 - 02 (1996).
112. Id. at 102.
113. Susan S. Blum, Note & Comment, The Illegal Immigration Reform &
Immigration Responsibility Act's One-Year Filing Deadline on Applications for
Asylum: The Narrow Interpretation and Applcation of Exceptions to the Fiing
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former Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) even amended
the regulations which previously granted immediate work permits to
all asylum applicants so that an applicant now has to wait 180 days
while the application is pending before they can obtain work
authorization.114 INS Commissioner Doris M. Meissner described this
and other reforms as a "dramatic success," and later data confirmed a
sharp decrease in the number of affirmative asylum applications."
Several years later, however, Ms. Meissner would state that the oneyear bar was an "overreaction" which was "born of assumptions
about a system in the past.""6
Nevertheless, the IIRIRA was passed amid strong opposition by
refugee advocates as well as the Clinton Administration."' The
UNHCR warned Congress that time limits on asylum claims would
violate obligations under international law." Just before the IIRIRA
was passed, a UNHCR Representative wrote to then Senator Orinn
Hatch that
failure to submit an asylum request within a certain time limit
should not lead to an asylum request being excluded from
consideration, as outlined in UNHCR Executive Committee
Conclusion No. 15 (1979). The United States is obliged to protect
refugees from return to danger regardless of whether a filing
deadline has been met."9
Upon signing the IIRIRA into law, President Clinton promised
to "correct provisions in this bill that are inconsistent with
international principles for refugee protection, including the
imposition of rigid deadlines for asylum applications."' 20 That
promise remains unfulfilled.

Deadline,22 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 463,471 (2005).
114. 8 C.F.R. § 208.7(a)(1).
115. HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, THE ASYLUM FILING DEADLINE: DENYING
PROTECTION TO THE PERSECUTED AND UNDERMINING GOVERNMENTAL EFFICIENCY
26 (2010), available at http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/wp-content/uploads/pdflafd.
pdf.
116. Id.
117. Pistone & Schrag, supranote 109, at 10.
118. Michele R. Pistone & Philip G. Schrag, The 1996 Immigration Act: Asylum
and Expedited Removal - What The INS Should Do, 73 INTERPRETER RELEASES
1565, 1567 (1996) (citing Letter from Anne Willem Vijleveld, UNHCR Rep., to Sen.
Orrin Hatch (Sept. 20, 1996)).
119. Id.
120. See Ramji, supranote 9, at 141.

2011]

Better Late Than Never

425

B. Application and Interpretation of the One-Year Bar
Several years after the IIRIRA was enacted, the Department of
Justice promulgated regulations interpreting the new one-year bar
provision.12' It elaborated on the two exceptions to the rule: changed
circumstances and extraordinary circumstances. 22 Specifically, the
regulations provided a nonexhaustive list of examples that would fit
under the two exceptions and clarified that an asylum application
must be submitted within a "reasonable period of time" of such
changed or extraordinary circumstances."' Finally, it required that a
changed circumstance be material to the claim for asylum and any
extraordinary circumstances could not be intentionally created by the
applicant. 124 A year later, in its Asylum Officer Training Manual
(Manual), the INS further interpreted the two exceptions.125 The
Manual prescribed a "flexible and inclusive" approach to examining
exceptions to the one-year bar."' It also indicated that a delay greater
than six months would likely be considered unreasonable.27
Unfortunately, however, there is evidence that such a "flexible
and inclusive" approach has not always been followed.12
Organizations that represent asylum seekers report that many claims
by bona fide refugees have been denied based on the one-year bar
where one of the statutory exceptions should have applied. 29
Numerous studies have also shed light on the extent to which the oneyear bar has affected asylum applicants.o The same year that
121. 8 C.F.R. § 208.4(a)(4); see also Musalo & Rice, supra note 105, at 696 - 97.
After 9/11, responsibility for immigration functions was transferred to the newly
created Department of Homeland Security.
122. 8 C.F.R. § 208.4(a)(4)-(a)(5).
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. INS, ASYLUM OFFICER TRAINING MANUAL: ONE YEAR FILING DEADLINE 7 15 (2001), available at http://www.asylumlaw.org/docs/united-states/asylum-officer
trainingoneyear_112001.pdf; see also Musalo & Rice, supra note 105, at 697. After
9/11, the INS was dissolved into three new agencies within the Department of
Homeland Security.
126. INS, supranote 125, at 15.
127. Id. at 17; see also HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, supra note 115, at 39.
128. Musalo & Rice, supra note 105, at 699.
129. Adjudicators often failed to apply one of the exceptions if the applicant's
circumstances were not explicitly listed in the regulations, even though the
regulations were intended to be "non-exhaustive." HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, supranote
115, at 30.
130. Id.; Philip G. Schrag et al., Rejecting Refugees: Homeland Security's
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IIRIRA was passed, Human Rights First (formerly the Lawyers
Committee for Human Rights) reported that only 38 percent of bona
fide asylum applicants applied for asylum within one year.'"' Based
on information provided by the former INS, approximately 6,198
asylum applications made between October 2000 and October 2001
were deemed "rejectable" based on the one-year bar. 3 2 Of those,
approximately 51 percent or 3,141 were actually rejected for failing to
fit in one of the two exceptions to the one-year bar.'33 It is hard to
believe that all 51 percent who failed to meet the one-year bar did not
have potentially legitimate claims to asylum, meaning that many bona
fide refugees were probably denied on a mere procedural ground.
In 2010, Human Rights First revealed that, between 1998 and
2009, approximately 53,400 applicants' (which comprises 15 percent
of all asylum seekers) requests for asylum were denied by the asylum
office due to the one-year bar.'34 The data also showed that denials
based on the one-year bar "increased sharply during the first several
years of its implementation - from 37% in 1998, to 39% in 1999, 42%
in 2000, and 51% in 2001 - leading to concerns that the filing deadline
was being applied in an increasingly narrow manner. . ..,,131
Another 2010 study analyzed the outcome of all affirmative
asylum applications since the one-year bar took effect in 1998 through
2009.131 It found that but for the one-year bar, the asylum office
would likely have granted 15,792 additional cases, impacting more
than 21,000 refugees when including their immediate families.' The
authors of the study state "[n]one of this would matter, however, if
the late applicants who were rejected were undeserving of asylum;
that is, if they would have been ineligible for asylum in any event
because they did not have bona fide cases, or worse, had fraudulent
claims."138 But that was not the case. Instead, they found that the
Administrationof the One- Year Bar to Asylum, 52 WM. & MARY L. REv. 651 (2010);
NATIONAL IMMIGRANT JUSTICE CENTER ET AL., THE ONE-YEAR ASYLUM DEADLINE
AND THE BIA: No PROTECTION, No PROCESS 2 (2010), available at
http://www.humanrights first.org/wp-content/uploads/pdf/1YD-report-FULL.pdf.
131. Pistone & Schrag, supra note 118, at 1566.
132. Pistone & Schrag, supra note 109, at 30 - 31.
133. Id.
134. HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, supra note 115, at 7.
135. Id at 29.
136. Schrag et al., supranote 130.
137. Id. at 659.
138. 1d at 745.
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grant rate for timely applicants and the grant rate for late applicants
who overcame the one-year bar was exactly the same."' This data
powerfully challenges the (mistaken) assumption that late applicants
generally have weaker or less legitimate claims for asylum than timely
applicants.
The risk of refoulement due to the one-year bar is further
compounded by the way that courts interpret asylum and withholding
of removal. In INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca,the U.S. Supreme Court held
that the burden of proof for asylum is a "well-founded fear," rather
than the higher and more burdensome "would be threatened" or
"clear probability" standard that is required for withholding of
removal.'40 Ironically, the benefits of asylum are much greater than
those for withholding; but the one clear disadvantage in cases affected
by the one-year bar is that the nonfoulement language incorporated
into the Refugee Act of 1980 attaches only to withholding of removal
and not to asylum. 14 1 Thus, the only option left for individuals who
fail to obtain asylum because of the one-year bar is withholding of
removal. Yet, in order to qualify for withholding, the applicant must
meet the higher burden ("would be threatened") to be protected
from refoulemenl142 This causes refugees who may have established a
well-founded fear of persecution - which is all that is required under
the Refugee Convention & Protocol - to be denied protection, in
contradiction to the intent and letter of international law. 43
Another reform introduced by the IIRIRA in 1996 was the
preclusion of federal judicial review of asylum claims related to the
one-year bar.1 " Although judicial review was partially restored by the
REAL ID Act of 2005, review was limited to "constitutional claims"
and "questions of law." 145 Only the Second and Ninth Circuits
currently allow judicial review of one-year bar claims where they raise
a constitutional claim or question of law.146 Although judicial review
is limited, these courts serve an important role in protecting bona fide
refugees from refoulement because on improper denials of asylum
139. Id.

140. Cardoza-Fonseca,480 U.S. at 443.
141. Khandwala et al., supra note 11, at 12.

142. Id.
143.
144.
145.
146.

Id.
HuMAN RIGHTS FIRST, supra note 115, at 40.
Id.
Id.
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due to the one-year bar.147 Yet most other circuit courts interpret
one-year bar issues as questions of fact, falling outside the realm of

judicial review.148
C. Other Consequences of the One-Year Bar
Since the IIRIRA was passed, many individuals in academic and
refugee advocacy communities have been arguing that the one-year
bar is both unfair and unnecessary.149 Although they will not be
discussed in detail here, a few of the most common arguments are
worth mentioning. First, asylum seekers are often unprepared to
apply for asylum shortly after their arrival because they may be
unaware of asylum itself, unaware of their eligibility for asylum,
and/or are focused on securing the basic necessities in order to
Second, many asylum seekers are victims of abuse or
survive.'
torture and suffer from emotional or psychological trauma for which
they need time and assistance to overcome."' Third, some asylumseekers have valid reasons for waiting to apply for asylum, including,
for example, to wait and see if conditions improve in their home
country before deciding between returning home or remaining in the
U.S. for an extended period or permanently."' Lastly, the asylum
process is a demanding and lengthy process, and one year is often an
insufficient amount of time for newly arrived refugees to secure
representation and/or to prepare a comprehensive application with
the necessary supporting documents.'
Some groups of applicants have been disproportionately affected
by the one-year bar due to their status or the special nature of their
past persecution. For example, applicants applying for asylum based
on sexual orientation, transgender identity, or HIV status often have
difficulty "coming out" and sharing their stories with complete
strangers; this is not surprising given the shame and mistreatment
147. Id.
148. Id
149. See, e.g. Pistone, supra note 111, at 9; Musalo & Rice, supra note 105, at 696;
HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, supra note 115, at 1, 42; and Victoria Neilson & Aaron

Morris, The Gay Bar: The Effect of the One- Year FilingDeadline on Lesbian, Gay,
Bisexual, Transgender, and HIV-Positive Foreign Nationals Seeking Asylum or
Withholding of Removal, 8 N.Y. CITY L. REV. 233, 279 (2005).
150. HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, supra note 115, at 5, 35.
151. Id. at 30.
152. Id at 34.

153. Id at 36 - 37.
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many of them experienced in their home countries." Furthermore,
such individuals often live under so much repression that they arrive
in the U.S. with little knowledge that their status may be a basis for
asylum."' Similar problems often arise in cases of women fleeing
domestic violence or other gender-related persecution, who also often
suffer from high rates of post-traumatic stress disorder, making it
extremely difficult for them to talk about their abuse and revisit
painful memories so soon after arriving in the U.S."'
The one-year bar creates special obstacles for impoverished
asylum seekers. It is not uncommon for refugees and asylum-seekers
to arrive in the U.S. with nothing but the clothes on their backs."'
Expecting asylum seekers to pay potentially thousands of dollars for
an attorney to represent them less than a year after arriving to the
U.S. is unrealistic and unreasonable.5 Free legal aid is a scarce
resource that simply cannot, at present, be provided to every
potential asylum applicant."9 Unfortunately, there is no right to free
legal counsel for the indigent in civil immigration court as there is in
criminal proceedings, even though the stakes and need for free legal
representation are similarly high.6 A news report by the American
Bar Association stated that more than half of respondents in removal
proceedings and 84 percent of detained respondents do not have legal
representation. 16 1 Yet studies show that access to representation is the
''single most important factor in determining whether an individual
will be granted asylum. ..."162 For example, one study found that
represented asylum seekers were three times as likely as
unrepresented asylum seekers to be granted asylum in immigration

154. Neilson & Morris, supra note 149, at 267.

155. Id. at 262-63.
156. Musalo & Rice, supranote 105, at 716 - 17.

157. See Michele R. Pistone, Assessing the ProposedRefugee ProtectionAct: One
Step in the Right Direction,14 GEO. IMMIG. L. J. 815, 824 (2000).
158. Pistone, supra note 157, at 824; see also Musalo & Rice, supra note 105, at
718-19.
159. See e.g., HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, supranote 115, at 36.
160. See Musalo & Rice, supra note 105, at 718.

161. New Report to ABA Addresses Crisis Within Imnngration Removal System,
AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, Feb. 2, 2010, http://www.abanet.org/abanet/medial

release/news release.cfm?releaseid=870.
162. HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, U.S. DETENTION OF ASYLUM SEEKERS: SEEKING
PROTECTION, FINDING PRISON 58 (2009), available at http://www.humanrightsfirst.
org/pdf/090429-RP-hrf-asylum-detention-report.pdf.
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court.'63 Another study found that only 11 percent of asylum seekers
without legal representation were granted asylum, whereas the figure
rose to 54 percent for those with representation.'" In contrast to the
U.S., Australia, Canada, and the U.K. all provide varying forms of
free legal aid and/or representation to asylum-seekers. 1s
The one-year bar has had other indirect effects on the ability of
refugees to bring an asylum claim. For instance, if an attorney is
worried that a client may be denied asylum based on the one-year
bar, and the client appears to have little or no other options for
immigration relief, the attorney may advise the client not to apply for
asylum because a negative decision could result in the start of
This means that
removal proceedings and possible deportation.'
some bona fide refugees may be pressured out of applying for a
benefit to which they are statutorily eligible and entitled.
Additionally, the one-year bar adds further stress on attorneys who
fear malpractice claims for "ineffective assistance of counsel" by
wrongly advising a client not to pursue a claim - even though
pursuing a claim and failing because of the one-year bar may risk
removal of their client.168
The one-year bar not only burdens bona fide asylum seekers, but
it strains government resources. The rule has increased inefficiency
in the asylum adjudication process by pushing more cases from the
Asylum Offices into already overburdened Immigration Courts.69
Refugees are also appealing negative one-year bar determinations by
immigration judges to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA).
From 2005 to 2008, over 19 percent of the BIA's caseload contained
163. Id.
164. HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, supranote 115, at 36.

165. Australia provides a publicly funded "migration agent" to persons at a port of
entry who, after an entry interview, appear at face value appear to meet Australia's
protection requirements. The migration agent then helps the refugee prepare and
make their asylum application. ASYLUM PROCEDURES, supra note 26, at 28. Asylum
seekers in Canada may receive assistance from the legal aid office in the province
where their claim is being heard. Id. at 91. The United Kingdom's National Asylum
Support Service offers legal aid for all destitute asylum seekers. Id.at 378.
166. Neilson & Morris, supra note 149, at 277 - 78; see also HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST,
supra note 115, at 36.
167. Neilson & Morris, supranote 149, at 278.
168. Id.
169. One-year bar cases are extremely time-consuming and sometimes require
separate witnesses, briefings, or even hearings before a court can reach the merits of
an asylum claim. HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, supranote 115, at 14 - 15.
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cases appealed in part because of the one-year bar.o Moreover, in
approximately half of the cases ultimately denied by the BIA due to
the one-year bar, this rule was the only ground cited for denial."'
In sum, the negative consequences of the one-year bar far
outweigh any potential benefits, and it unjustly prevents bona-fide
refugees from obtaining asylum for failure to meet a mere procedural
requirement.
V. Recommendations
To ensure that the U.S. comes closer to fulfilling its obligations
under international law, the author recommends a series of reforms
which would afford greater protections to individuals seeking asylum
in the U.S.
First, the clear preference is that Congress eliminates the oneyear filing deadline entirely. Several legislative proposals would do
just that; these and other similar proposals should be supported in any
way possible.'72 If full elimination of the one-year bar does not secure
enough legislative support, the author recommends a number of other
alternatives. It should be noted, however, that many of these
alternative proposals would still not cure the U.S. of its failure to
meet its international treaty obligations and would continue to set the
U.S. apart from the more flexible practices of Australia, Canada, and
the U.K.
Second, Congress should eliminate the one-year bar and replace
it with a provision stating that the timeliness of an application may be
considered as one factor when making a credibility determination
(similar to Australia, Canada, and the U.K.). Nonetheless, it should
be noted that the issue of whether a delay in filing an asylum
application is indicative of a lack of credibility is itself contested;
indeed, some psychological evidence would suggest the exact
opposite, that bona fide refugees will often be traumatized and suffer
from psychological problems that prevent them from coming forward
and talking about their past persecution."

170. Id. at 7.
171. NATIONAL IMMIGRANT JUSTICE CENTER ET AL., supra note 130, at 2.
172. See e.g., Refugee Protection Act of 2010, S. 3113, 111th Cong. § 3 (2010);
Comprehensive Immigration Reform Act of 2010, S. 3932, 111th Cong. § 255 (2010);
Restoring Protection to Victims of Persecution Act, H.R. 4800, 111th Cong. (2010).
173. Musalo & Rice, supranote 105, at 703.

432

Hastings Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.

[Vol. 34:2

Third, the Department of Homeland Security or Congress should
issue further regulations or pass legislation that builds in more explicit
exceptions to the one-year bar. This would help prevent bona fide
refugees from being refouled to a country where they face
persecution merely because they failed to meet a procedural
requirement. For example, failure to apply within one year because
an impoverished asylum seeker was unable to secure legal
representation should be a recognized exception.
Fourth, extend the filing deadline to a period longer than one
year. This would recognize that many asylum applicants suffer from
continuing trauma and mental health problems, have language and
cultural barriers, and cannot easily secure legal representation, all of
which affect their ability to apply within one year.
Fifth, Congress should restore judicial review to asylum claims
with one-year bar issues. This would resolve the current circuit split
and prevent courts from avoiding judicial review by characterizing
one-year bar claims as questions of fact. It will also ensure greater
accuracy in asylum adjudications with one-year bar issues, thereby
minimizing the risk of refoulement of bona fide refugees in breach of
international law.
Sixth, although not addressing the issue of the rule itself, the
government, at the very least, should conduct an investigation into
the number and types of cases being denied under the one-year bar.
All asylum offices, immigration courts, and the BIA should be
required to record and report the number of cases that are referred or
denied because of the one-year bar in order to establish accurate
statistics. The agencies should coordinate efforts so the same cases
can be tracked as they transfer between the three agencies. 7 4 This
data would shed light on the extent to which asylum applicants are
affected by this rule, perhaps eventually garnering enough legislative
support to change it.
Seventh, although this also does not impact the rule itself, the
government should consider creating a system whereby impoverished
asylum seekers unable to secure legal representation are offered free
legal assistance in filing their application for asylum, similar to what is
provided in Australia, Canada, and the U.K. This would help
alleviate the significant disadvantages impoverished asylum seekers

174. See suggestions for better data collection in Schrag et al, supra note 130, at
768-69.
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face in presenting their claims, which is exacerbated by their inability
to work legally in the U.S. until 180 days after their application has
been submitted to the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services or
the Executive Office for Immigration Review."'
VI. Conclusion
The U.S. one-year bar rule is problematic on many levels. It is
inconsistent with the Refugee Convention and Protocol and violates
the duty of nonrefoulement. Such a rigid filing deadline is out of step
with the practice of other countries that, like the U.S., admit large
numbers of refugees into their territories each year. Canada,
Australia, and the U.K., for example, impose no filing deadlines on
asylum applications in their respective countries, but they do allow
the timeliness of an application to factor into credibility
determinations. Furthermore, critics have shown that the one-year
bar is unfair, unnecessary, and creates an unreasonable burden on
arriving refugees. It disproportionately affects applicants with claims
based on sexual orientation or transgender identity, HIV-positive
individuals, women fleeing gender-related persecution, and
impoverished asylum seekers who are unable to secure legal
representation. When the IIRIRA was passed, Senator Hatch stated
that "if the time limit and its exceptions do not provide adequate
protection to those with legitimate claims of asylum, I will remain
committed to revisiting this issue in a later Congress."' 76 Now is a
good time to revisit this issue. The possibility of comprehensive
immigration reform is increasing and several legislative proposals
have already been put on the table (some even eliminating the oneyear bar altogether).m Congress should take this opportunity to
reaffirm our commitment to international refugee law and provide
meaningful protection to our nation's refugees.

175. 8 C.F.R. § 208.7(a)(1).
176. 142 CONG. REC. S11, 491 (1996).
177. See Refugee Protection Act of 2010, supra note 172; and Comprehensive
Immigration Reform Act of 2010, supra note 172; and Restoring Protection to
Victims of Persecution Act, supra note 172.
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